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RICO'S ROLE IN SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION:
SHOULD IT BE FACILITATED OR RESTRICTED?
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RI-
CO) as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. RICO constituted part
of a comprehensive endeavor to eradicate organized crime in the United States.2 This
legislative innovation targeted a wide range of racketeering activities, including mur-
der, kidnapping, gambling, extortion, telephone and wire fraud, and the subject of this
article, fraud in the Fale of securities.
A circuit split exists on the requirements a plaintiff must meet to have standing
to sue for securities fraud under RICO. Specifically, the courts are split on whether a
RICO plaintiff must have been a purchaser or seller of the securities to have standing.
A primary reason for this pending controversy is that section 1961(l)(D) of RICO does
not specify what "fraud in the sale of securities" exactly means for potential RICO
plaintiffs. Must plaintiffs themselves be the purchasers or sellers of the securities at
issue? Or, must plaintiffs merely be injured by a fraudulent sale of securities?
This circuit split has been long standing.3 The Fourth and Eighth Circuits hold
that plaintiffs must be purchasers or sellers of securities to have standing. The Second,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits maintain that the purchaser/seller requirement should not
apply in RICO securities fraud cases. In 1992, in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protec-
tion Corp.,4 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this circuit split. However,
the majority opinion only focused on issues of causation and refused to rule on the
buyer/seller requirement as applied to RICO securities cases. Therefore, the circuit split
still remains well entrenched.
The difficulty in interpreting RICO's provision for "fraud in the sale of securi-
ties" has serious ramifications. One of the most troubling consequences is that with the
indecision on how to interpret this section of the statute, the eligible class of RICO
plaintiffs and potentially liable defendants is unclear. The courts need to come to a
uniform manner of interpreting this provision, especially considering the importance of
RICO claims, which can reward plaintiffs enormously and stigmatize or financially
ruin defendants.
This article will discuss the conflict among the courts and propose a legislative
solution to this circuit split: the courts should not impose a purchaser/seller limitation
on standing to bring RICO cases based on securities fraud. The statute itself does not
1. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
2. Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
RICO sought to achieve its goals "by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies."
3. While the reader should be aware of the recent development in the House, unless the bill
becomes a law, the circuit split discussed in this article remains relevant.
4. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992).
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include such a limitation, and the legislative history does not show such an intent.
Therefore, assuming that Congress did not originally intend for such a restriction to be
read into the statute, Congress should amend section 1961(1)(D) to specifically state
that a plaintiff need not be a purchaser or seller of the securities to have standing to
sue under RICO.
II. DISCUSSION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. How the RICO Purchaser/Seller Debate Arose
The purchaser/seller standing requirement actually arose from a different context
in securities law, independent from RICO. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores,5 the Supreme Court limited the class of private plaintiffs that could bring secu-
rities fraud suits under Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.6 It is settled
that for standing in lOb-5 cases, the plaintiffs must be purchasers or sellers of the
securities at issue. However, whether that same purchaser/seller limitation must be
applied to RICO claims based on predicate acts of securities fraud was unclear after
Blue Chip Stamps.
The policies behind restricting lOb-5 causes of action with the purchaser/seller
limitation arguably could be applicable to securities claims under RICO as well.' First,
since the mere pendency of a securities fraud suit can seriously damage the
defendant's business, plaintiffs who can avoid early dismissal on grounds of standing
may force settlements even when they would unlikely succeed at trial. Both Rule lOb-
5 and RICO have strong "setilement value" which can be abused in this manner by
plaintiffs. Second, if standing is not restricted in some way, defendants and courts may
suffer from floods of frivolous claims. Third, without a limit, non-buyers or non-sellers
may file strike suits, alleging that but for the alleged fraudulent conduct, they would
not have entered into a certain transaction.
Thus, there may exist some sound policies to impose the Blue Chips Stamps
standing requirement on RICO claims based on securities fraud. However, not all
courts have chosen to do so, for good reason.
B. The Fourth and Eighth Circuits Require RICO Plaintiffs to Be Purchasers or
Sellers of Securities8
In International Data Bank v. Zepkin,9 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that a plaintiff must be either a purchaser or seller of securities to have standing to
bring a RICO claim for securities fraud. In this case, defendants Eugene Zepkin and
5. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 780) (1988 & Supp. V. 1993) (commonly known as Rule 10b-5). Rule lob-5 the
1934 Act provides that "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange . . . to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading .... "
7. Harvey L. Pitt, Dixie L. Johnson, and Jonathan Shub, Court Leaves Unlimited Private RICO's
Reach, N.J.L.J., May 18, 1992, p. 7 .
8. This article focuses on Fourth Circuit's discussion of the purchaser/seller standing requirement.
However, see Brannan v. Eisenstein, 804 F.2d 1041 (8th Cir. 1986), for a discussion of the Eighth
Circuit's reasoning for adopting this requirement.
9. International Data Bank v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1986).
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Harold Grossman issued stock for their new corporation, International Data Bank
(IDB). Outside investors later took control of IDB, ousted Zepkin and Grossman, and
sued them, alleging violations of Rule lOb-5 because of a fraudulent prospectus.
However, IDB's injury was not related to its purchase or sale of securities. In-
stead, IDB complained that it was induced to repay Zepkin and Grossman for start-up
costs which the defendants exaggerated in the prospectus. Since the fraudulent injury
took place after the stock offering had already taken place, IDB sued neither as a
purchaser nor a seller of securities.
The Fourth Circuit denied IDB standing on several grounds. First, it referred to
the statutory language of RICO. The court concluded that "fraud in the sale of securi-
ties" was a purposely narrow phrase, which suggested a "pivotal role of the actual
sales transaction."' Therefore, the court found that this statutory construction high-
lighted the necessity for plaintiffs to' have been involved in the sale.
Second, the Fourth Circuit looked to the history of federal securities law, predat-
ing RICO. Almost a quarter century before RICO, and before the Supreme Court ruled
on Blue Chip Stamps, the purchaser/seller requirement had been imposed on plaintiffs
seeking standing for 1Ob-5 claims; the Second Circuit created this limitation in
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.," and a great majority of lower federal courts fol-
lowed Birnbaum.
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, based on this pervasive practice in securities
law, the limitation on lOb-5 claims should extend to RICO securities claims as well.
As the court stated, "we think the better view is that Congress meant for RICO to
simply expand the range of remedies by allowing for treble damage and attorneys'
fees, rather than to summarily overturn the settled law."'"
Third, the Fourth Circuit looked to practical policy considerations. It noted that
securities litigation presents a "danger of vexatiousness different in degree and kind
from that which accompanies litigation in general."' 3 The court sought to avoid dis-
rupting business activity with lawsuits "designed to poison the atmosphere with accusa-
tions of fraud."' 4 Also, it wanted to preclude meritless claims pursued merely for their
"settlement value."' 5 Fourth, problems of proof addressed in Blue Chip Stamps would
also apply to RICO cases, according to the Fourth Circuit. The difficulty boils down to
non-sellers and non-buyers attempting to prove a non-event, essentially their failure to
buy or sell stock. For example, bystander plaintiffs could wait in the wings and then
sue, claiming they missed golden investment opportunities because of fraudulent dis-
closure or unnecessarily pessimistic projections.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit noted the possibility that another test, such as deter-
mining whether the injury was "direct" or "remote," could serve to limit standing in
RICO cases. However, the court concluded that this standard was too vague and that
the purchaser/seller requirement, by contrast, was more clear-cut.
10. Id. at 152.
11. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952).
12. International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1987).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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C. The Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits Do Not Require that Plaintiffs Be
Purchasers or Sellers of Securities"'
In Securities Investor Protection Corp. (SIPC) v. Vigman,"7 the Ninth Circuit
held that SIPC had standing to assert a securities fraud claim under RICO even though
it was not a purchaser or seller of the securities. In Vigman, SIPC sued seventy-five
officers and directors of six publicly traded corporations. The defendants were alleged-
ly involved in a conspiracy to manipulate the stock prices of these corporations.
Through the vehicle of two brokerage firms, the defendants created an illusion of
active markets by engaging in misleading transactions in their corporate and customer
accounts. When investors discovered the scheme, the stock prices dropped dramatical-
ly. The brokerage firms became defunct, and in the liquidation proceedings SIPC had
to disburse nearly $13 million to satisfy customer claims not covered by the
brokerages' assets.
The district court ruled that SIPC did not have standing to assert a RICO claim
because SIPC was not a purchaser or seller of the securities. However, the circuit court
reversed on two main grounds. First, looking to RICO's text, the court noted that
RICO has no express purchaser/seller limitation. RICO's standing provision states that
"[any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962" may sue."8
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit followed the Eleventh Circuit's lead and said that
anyone injured "by reason of' fraud in the sale of securities may sue under RICO,
regardless of whether or not that person bought or sold the securities.'9 The court
contrasted RICO's language to that of Rule lOb-5, which specifically requires that the
unlawful conduct must be "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."20
Second, in addition to the textual difference between RICO and Rule lOb-5, the
remedies for these statutes are not alike. Congress created RICO's remedy of a private
civil cause of action when it enacted the statute. Congress did not impose the purchas-
er/seller limitation on the standing requirements. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that it was
therefore not appropriate for the courts to add in this additional standing prerequisite.
The lob-5 remedy, on the other hand, is judicially created. Therefore, as the
Vigman decision explained, it would be appropriate for the courts to alter its judicial
remedy by circumscribing the class of plaintiffs that can bring lob-5 claims. This is
just what the Supreme Court did in Blue Chip Stamps.
III. RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
It is axiomatic that statutory interpretation should begin with the language of the
statute itself.2' RICO purposely provides an express cause of action with a broad
standing provision, available to any person injured "by reason of' a violation of a
16. This article concentrates on the Ninth Circuit. See also, In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 812 F.
Supp. 338 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Warner v. Alexander Grant & Co., 828 F.2d 1528 (1lth Cit. 1987), for
additional support for the position that the purchaser/seller limitation should not be applied to standing
in RICO cases.
17. Securities Investor Protection Corp. (SIPC) v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
19. 828 F.2d 1528, 1530 (lth Cir. 1987).
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
21. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps, 95 S. Ct. at 756, (Powell, J., concurring).
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RICO predicate offense.2 Nowhere does RICO impose a further limitation on stand-
ing.
In Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion of Holmes v. Securities Investor Pro-
tection Corp., she explained that Blue Chip Stamps' purchaser/seller standing limitation
applied to lOb-5 claims, which have a judicially implied cause of action. The Justice
noted that
if Congress had legislated the elements of a private cause of action for damages,
the duty of the Judicial Branch would be to administer the law which Congress
enacted; the Judiciary may not circumscribe a right which Congress has conferred
because of any disagreement it might have with Congress about the wisdom of
creating so expansive a liability. 3
Justice O'Connor admitted that the problems of unrestricted standing for securi-
ties fraud plaintiffs are compounded in RICO cases. The threat of treble damages often
leads plaintiffs to abuse RICO's "settlement value," and the stigma of labelling the de-
fendant a "racketeer" increases the litigation's vexatiousness.
However, she concluded that since Congress specifically provided the elements
of a private cause of action under RICO, then "despite the very real specter of vexa-
tious litigation based on speculative damages, it is within Congress' power to create a
private right of action for plaintiffs who have neither bought nor sold securities."24
A liberal reading of RICO is compatible with both its Congressional Statement
of Findings and Purpose,' which describes RICO as an innovative crime-fighting
weapon designed to provide additional remedies, and provisions of its Liberal Con-
struction directive,26 which mandates that RICO be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial goals. The 1952 Birnbaum decision created the purchaser/seller limitation for
Rule 10b-5. This limitation was not designed for RICO securities fraud cases in the
1990's. When applied to RICO claims, this limitation fails to account for the novelty
and uniqueness of RICO, as a stepped-up legislative measure against todays escalating
crime.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND STATUTORY REVISIONS
Unless the legislature decides otherwise, the RICO statute should be read and
interpreted according to its language and its few interpretive guidelines, such as the
Liberal Construction directive. Accordingly, the circuits should not enforce the pur-
chaser/seller requirement on standing for RICO claims.
Section 1961(1)(D) could be amended to have the predicate act of racketeering
read "fraud in the sale of securities, whether or not the claimant is a purchaser or
seller of the securities." (The emphasized portion represents the proposed amendment.)
This amendment would thus solve the circuit split and allow RICO to be interpreted
22. See supra note 18.
23. 112 S. Ct. at 1327 (1992), quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 95 S. Ct. 1917,
1931 (1975).
24. 112 S. Ct. at 1327
25. According to the Statement of Findings and Purpose, the goal of RICO was "to seek the
eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-
gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." 18 U.S.C. §
1961.
26. 84 STAT. 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961) (West 1984).
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most closely to the original intent of the drafters.
